33d Corps fought methodically southward in a series of complex maneuvers, and by May 3 only bits and pieces remained of the once strong Japanese forces. At the end of May, Fourteenth Army headquarters moved to India to begin planning for Operation Zipper, the invasion of Malaya; its duties in Burma were passed on to the newly formed Twelfth Army. Although the invasion of Malaya was not necessary, the Fourteenth did perform occupation duties there until it was deactivated on November 1, 1945.

FOURTH ARMY (U.S.). Activated in August 1932 as one of the four new field armies created by the War Department, the Fourth Army just before World War II was assigned the mission of constituting the Western Defense Command, which had to defend the Pacific coast and Alaska. After the war began, the Western Defense Command became active, using Fourth Army personnel, and was known as the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. The Fourth Air Force was added, along with additional ground forces to defend KISKA and ATTU Islands. The Fourth Army separated from the Western Defense Command on September 18, 1943, and reorganized at San Jose, Calif. In April 1944 the bulk of the Fourth Army staff was ordered overseas to establish the NINTH ARMY, and in August the newly reorganized staff was alerted for overseas duty to organize the FIFTEENTH ARMY. The Fourth Army had furnished the staffs for two additional field armies and had trained and equipped at least half of the combat units shipped overseas. By September 1944 the Fourth Army had absorbed all of the Second Army's duties west of the Mississippi. It remained in the United States throughout the war.

FOURTH OF JULY RAID. On July 4, 1942, the 15th Bombardment Squadron (Light) became the first American unit to attack a target in occupied Europe. Six of the squadron's crews, flying American-built Douglas Bostons (*see* A-20) supplied them by the Royal Air Force, joined six British crews of No. 226 Squadron in attacking four airfields in Holland. Owing to heavy antiaircraft fire, only two of the American crews actually bombed their assigned targets; two of the American-manned planes were shot down and a third was badly damaged.

FOX. Code name for serially numbered broadcasts to U.S. Navy ships from Pearl Harbor. The coded transmissions carried information for all ships; each ship deciphered the message that applied to it. Broadcasts from Canberra were called "Bells."

FOXHOLE. A protection pit for one or two men, usually dug by the occupants. A foxhole was generally cut hastily but might be made more secure as time and materials permitted.

FRANCE, BATTLE OF. The German campaign in western Europe during the spring of 1940, usually called the Battle of France, passed through three general stages. The opening phase from May 10 to 16 included the invasion of Holland and Belgium, the fall of EBEN EMAEL and other Belgian frontier defenses and the Allied counteradvance to the MEUSE and Dyle Rivers (*see* DYLE LINE) in order to meet and contain the German invaders in concert with the BELGIAN ARMY. The second stage encompassed the main German thrust through the ARDENNES Forest in southern Belgium and across the Meuse near SEDAN with the bulk of their armored divisions on May 15. Once the French lines were pierced, the mobile German forces quickly drove west to the sea, splitting the Allied forces in two and forcing the northern Allied armies, including the BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (BEF), out of Belgium and back to the English Channel. The Belgians surrendered on May 27, the French First Army capitulated on June 1 and the last naval vessel left DUNKIRK on June 3. The final stage began two days later when the GERMAN ARMY attacked the remaining French forces, which had established a thin defensive line north of PARIS. The French front was quickly breached, leading to a general withdrawal south. Paris fell on June 14, the MAGINOT LINE was surrounded four days later and shortly after midnight on June 25 an armistice went into effect, ending the struggle with about two-thirds of France in German control. (Actually, a Franco-German armistice was signed on June 22 at COMPIÈGNE; hostilities officially ceased six hours after the signing of a Franco-Italian armistice on June 24.)

On the eve of the battle the opposing forces were approximately equal. Germany had marshaled 118 infantry divisions, 10 armored (PANZER) and 8 motorized infantry divisions, and 1 cavalry and 1 parachute division on the Western Front. These forces were controlled by 3 army group, 10 army and 38 corps headquarters. In the north, Army Group B (General von BOCK), opposite Holland and northern Belgium, included 3 panzer divisions, an airborne division and 27 infantry divisions. In the center, opposite southern Belgium and the Ardennes, was Army Group A (von RUNDSTEDT), Germany's strongest force, with 7 panzer and 36 infantry divisions. To the south, opposite the Maginot Line, was the relatively weak Army Group C (von LEEB) with 19 infantry divisions. About 40 more infantry divisions were in general reserve.

The key units were the 10 panzer divisions. In Army Group B the 9th Panzer Division operated independently, while the 3d and 4th Panzers belonged to the XVI Panzer Corps (HOEPPNER). Of the seven in Army Group A, the 5th and 7th (ROMMEL) Panzer Divisions belonged to the XV Corps (HOTH), while the special von KLEIST Armored Group controlled the 1st, 2d and 10th Panzers of the XIX Corps (GUDERIAN) and the 6th and 8th Panzers of the XLI Corps (REINHARDT), as well as four motorized infantry divisions. Each of the panzer divisions had about 325 mixed armored vehicles with motorized infantry, artillery and support units.

Against Germany's 138 divisions, France put about 100 on her northeastern frontier, including 68 foot, 7 motorized and the equivalent of 14 fortress infantry divisions, 5 cavalry divisions and 4 cavalry brigades, 3 armored cavalry divisions and 3 brigade-size heavy armored divisions. A fourth armored division (DE GAULLE), along with many ad hoc infantry and cavalry formations, was slapped together during the ensuing battle, and several units were transferred north from other fronts. To this must be added the 11 British divisions (including 1 armored division which arrived during the battle), 22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions, for a grand total of 144 Allied divisions.

VF - Battle of France

German armor advances in France

The Anglo-French forces were disposed in three army groups. Groups Two and Three, with about 50 divisions, stood behind the Maginot Line, while the best Allied units belonged to Army Group One (BILLOTTE), covering the exposed Belgian frontier. In the extreme north was the French Seventh Army (GIRAUD) with 7 divisions, including 1 armored cavalry and 1 motorized infantry division. Next came the BEF (Lord GORT) with 9 infantry divisions and 1 tank brigade. On the British southern flank was the French First Army (BLANCHARD) with 8 first-rate infantry divisions and the Cavalry Corps (Prioux) of 2 armored cavalry divisions. Farther south, behind the Ardennes and along the Meuse, were the Ninth (CORAP) and Second (HUNTZIGER) Armies with 16 divisions, including 4 cavalry divisions, 4 second-class infantry divisions (Series B) of older reservists and several fortress detachments. The southern edge of the Second Army rested on the northern tip of the Maginot Line.

It should be noted that the French armor was divided among 3 armored cavalry divisions, 3 heavy armored divisions (in reserve) and over 40 independent tank battalions providing direct support to infantry units. In addition, the 5 cavalry and 7 motorized infantry divisions had separate armored components. But with the exception of Gen. René Prioux's Cavalry Corps, none of the French armored or motorized formations operated in concert.

The major antagonists were well endowed with modern equipment and weapons. SMALL ARMS, including automatic weapons, were excellent on both sides. French heavy, field and antitank artillery was superior in quality and more plentiful than that of their opponents, though much of this equipment was still horse-drawn in both armies. In antiaircraft artillery the Germans took a strong lead, and their heavier 88-mm. pieces proved to be deadly dual-purpose weapons. The two sides employed about the same number of armored vehicles—slightly over 4,000—but the French machines tended to be slower and more heavily armed and armored, while the German vehicles were spacious and fast, built for maneuver. British armor was a hodgepodge of heavily armored "infantry" TANKS and thin-skinned "cruiser" and reconnaissance machines. But the most important fact was the concentration of German armor and vehicles in the panzer divisions and panzer corps.

In aircraft, Germany had a decided numerical superiority as well as a slight qualitative edge. Against about 1,000 Allied fighters and 400 bombers in the northeast, the LUFTWAFFE employed some 1,100 fighters, approximately the same number of horizontal bombers and about 325 special dive-bombers (STUKAS). France and Britain had no aircraft comparable with the Stuka, and most of France's 750 first-line fighters were slower than their counterparts. More significant, the German Air Force was organized to support the Army's tactical operations, whereas the tactical role of Allied air power was limited to reconnaissance and air defense. Moreover, both Britain and France retained large numbers of aircraft in their interiors for strategic air defense. (Paradoxically, both Allied air forces were numerically



THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE WEST on the eve of the German invasion—May 1940

stronger at the close of the battle than at the beginning.) As in the case of armor, the Allies were not organized to use what they had most effectively.

At first, the German high command planned to launch an attack through northern Belgium similar to the World War I modified Schlieffen plan. Most of their mobile forces were thus allotted to Army Group B, which was expected only to secure Holland, Belgium and small sections of northeastern France along the Channel. Unlike 1914, the thrust was not to extend south to and past Paris, and hence was not expected to be decisive. The commander of Army Group A, Gen. Gerd von Rundstedt, and his chief of staff, Gen. Erich von MANSTEIN, objected to the plan, and over the initial opposition of Army chief Gen. Walther von BRAUCHITSCH, convinced Adolf HITLER that the main German thrust should be directed through southern Belgium at Sedan and from there to the Channel coast. The northern Allied armies would thus be caught between Army Groups A and B, and destroyed. The fact

that the original German plan had fallen into Allied hands after an airplane crash only made the new proposal more appealing.

The French Commander in Chief, Gen. Maurice GAMELIN, also expected another 1914-style German drive though northern Belgium and disposed his forces accordingly. The mobile forces of the BEF and the French First Army were to swing east through Belgium and join the Belgian Army on the Dyle Line south of ANTWERP. To the south, the French Second and Ninth Armies would constitute the hinge of this movement and were to entrench themselves on the Meuse River between Sedan and NAMUR. Although less mobile, most of these forces were already in place and expected no immediate opposition. Over the objections of Gen. Alphonse GEORGES, Northeast Front commander, and Gen. Gaston Billotte, commander of the First Army Group, Gamelin also insisted that Billotte's reserve army, the Seventh, race across northern Belgium to aid the Dutch. Although there had been no military coordination with Belgium and Holland, owing to their hope of remaining neutral, the French commander felt that the addition of their armies to the Allied cause was worth the risk.

The opposing commanders were generally satisfied with the outcome of the initial phase of the battle. While Holland quickly collapsed and the outlying Belgian defenses at LIÈGE, MAASTRICHT and along the Albert Canal fell rapidly to German airborne and armored units, the Allied advance into Belgium was unchallenged and the bulk of the Belgian Army remained intact. Gen. Henri Giraud's Seventh Army moved quickly into southern Holland, but since the Dutch were withdrawing north, he was unable to achieve any linkup and, after inconclusive battles with the 9th Panzer Division, was ordered on May 12 to re-



THE GERMAN SWEEP: By May 20, panzers had thrust to the English Channel

group his forces on the northern flank of the Belgian Army. The Belgian and British forces were busy occupying a defensive line around Antwerp and along the Dyle River, with little interference. More critical to the French plan was the establishment of Gen. Georges Blanchard's First Army in the "Gembloux Gap," between the Dyle and Meuse Rivers. Here General Prioux's Cavalry Corps fought a fierce delaying action with Gen. Erich Hoeppner's XVI Panzer Corps on May 11–14. Losses were heavy, but Prioux won enough time to allow Blanchard's infantry to arrive in place. Then, in expectation of further German attacks around Gembloux, the armored cavalry forces were split up among the infantry divisions and Georges committed two of his three reserve armored divisions to Blanchard. South of Namur, Gen. André Corap's Ninth Army moved into place, and the remaining French forces continued to work on their defensive positions along the Meuse. The only discordant note here came from the five French cavalry divisions which had been sent forward into the Ardennes and reported running into strong German opposition.

On May 15 the Allied armies seemed firmly established in Belgium from Antwerp to Namur but, from the German point of view, they had entered Manstein's trap and it was only necessary to slam the door shut. So as not to force the Allies back too early, the XVI Panzer Corps was withdrawn from the Gembloux area on May 16 and sent south to the Ardennes, where the bulk of the German panzers were located. It was here that the main German attack took place.

The French Ninth Army was to hold the Meuse River from Namur south to Sedan, about 75 miles, with five divisions on line—the 5th Motorized, the 18th, 22d and 61st Infantry and the 102d Fortress Division. The first three had to move up to the Meuse from the French

border, while the 61st, a Series B division of older reservists, and the static 102d already were in prepared positions. Two more divisions stood in reserve. South of the 102d, the Second Army defended the Sedan area, a sector of about 25 miles, with the 3d North African and two Series B divisions, the 55th and 71st. The defenders occupied a network of half-completed field fortifications which in no way could be considered an extension of the Maginot Line.

On May 10 the seven panzer divisions pushed across the frontiers of Belgium and Luxembourg and through the narrow Ardennes roads. The XV and XLI Panzer Corps headed for the Ninth Army's positions on the Meuse, while Gen. Heinz Guderian's XIX Corps, followed by the XIV Motorized Corps, aimed straight for Sedan. On May 11 and 12 these units pushed the French cavalry back and arrived quickly at the Meuse. In the center, Gen. G.-H. Reinhardt's XLI Corps attacked but made no impression against the well-dug-in 61st and 102d Divisions. The German thrusts to the north and south, however, were more successful. In the north, the French 18th and 22d Divisions took their time moving up to the Meuse and allowed an advance party of German infantry to gain a foothold on the western bank near Dinant on the evening of May 12. French counterattacks the following day were sluggish and uncoordinated, and failed to eject the weak German force. German reinforcements enlarged the bridgehead on May 13, and by the following day tanks of the 5th and 7th Panzers were crossing the river, forcing Corap to move his entire army back.

To the south, before Sedan, Guderian's forces arrived on May 12 and attacked the following morning across the Meuse with assault infantry supported by direct-fire weapons and tactical aircraft. Again the French failed to launch effective counterattacks and allowed the Germans to expand their initial penetrations. By the morning of May 14 the 55th and 71st Divisions had been overrun and German armor was crossing the Meuse and pushing west.

The breakthroughs at Dinant and Sedan spelled the end of the Ninth Army. By May 15 the 102d and 61st Divisions were caught between the advancing Germans and, together with several confused reserve divisions, quickly destroyed. Only the long-retreating cavalry units managed to extricate themselves. The fate of the three French heavy armored divisions was even more tragic. One moved from the rear of the French First Army south toward Dinant on May 14 but was unable to link up with any friendly forces and was overrun while refueling the following morning. A second followed the first but was scattered by the rapid German advance before it had a chance to deploy. Finally, the third arrived south of Sedan on May 13 but, instead of attacking, was broken up and used to cover the flank of the rest of the Second Army. In fact, from May 15 to 20, as the German armor continued to drive west toward the coast, the French high command continued to pile its reserve units on the flanks of the German breakthrough in a vain effort to reestablish a continuous front. Each day they supposed that the German attack would exhaust itself and they would be able to launch a series of slow, methodical counterattacks. But the only serious ripostes during this period were made by Gen. Charles de Gaulle's 4th Armord Division on May 17 and 19 from Laon and by British armor attacking south from Arras on May 21. Neither thrust was reinforced, and both were easily beaten back. The German panzers had been followed closely by motorized and foot infantry columns, which secured the flanks of the advance and organized bridgeheads for further attacks. Gamelin's dismissal and replacement on May 19 by Gen. Maxime WEYGAND failed to alter the situation.

The French high command had had its eyes fixed on the Gembloux Gap and had failed to discern the German thrust through the Ardennes until about May 15, long after the Ninth Army had collapsed. From May 12 to 14, Allied air power was concentrated in northern Belgium to protect the Allied forward movement and was switched to the Ardennes sector only after the Germans had crossed the Meuse. None of the Allied generals had thought the enemy capable of pushing through the Ardennes Forest and then mounting sustained attacks over a major river against prepared defensive positions in the span of three or four days. It was the tempo of the German attack that prevented the French from reacting effectively. The paralysis that seemed to take place during the ensuing period was perhaps only the result of their initial psychological shock coupled with their inability to predict German intentions. As long as the German armor kept moving, the French were unable to put together a current picture of the battlefield and deploy their reserve forces accordingly. Many Frenchmen felt that the main German objective was Paris rather than the Channel coast. And, of course, the commitment of most of the Allied mobile forces to northern Belgium early in the campaign limited their options during the second stage of the battle.

The Allied forces above Namur began withdrawing west on May 16 and, using their armored cavalry and reserve units to cover their rear, slowly backed up to the Franco-Belgian coast. Only Hitler's decision on May 24 to halt the panzer advance to Dunkirk prevented a greater disaster. As it was, the surrender of the Belgian Army on May 27 opened up more gaps in the Allied line and spurred the British-led evacuation which had begun at Dunkirk. Then, while the bulk of the French First Army was trapped at Lille, the remaining Allied forces of Army Group One headed for the coast. Despite determined intervention by the Luftwaffe, between May 26 and June 4 about 338,000 troops, including 110,000 French soldiers, were ferried safely to Britain. Nevertheless, the net loss of over 60 Allied divisions signified the end of France.

During the final phase of the campaign, some 60 weak French divisions faced over twice as many German formations. Most critical was the northern front above Paris, where some 40 French divisions defended 225 miles along the SOMME and Aisne Rivers. Here Weygand ordered his troops to establish a series of small strongpoints, or HEDGEHOGS, which would continue to resist even when bypassed by German armor. All French mobile forces were to be concentrated in three mobile reserves which would counterattack any German breakthrough. However, from about May 24 to June 5, while the German panzers rested, the remaining French armored units had been hurled against German bridgeheads at Péronne and ABBEVILLE in a mistaken effort to strengthen the French defensive line.

As a result, when the Germans launched their final assaults there was almost no French armored reserve to meet them.

German armor was now reorganized into five panzer corps of two armored divisions and one motorized infantry division each. On June 5 three panzer corps attacked across the Somme, and on June 9 the remaining two pushed over the Aisne. This time French infantry resisted bitterly, but after several days of fierce fighting the panzers again pushed through the French line, Weygand's strongpoints were overrun and the French were forced to withdraw south. On June 14 the Germans entered Paris, and they began to outflank the forces on the Maginot Line. The decision to evacuate the line was made too late, and by June 17 the four armies on the frontier were cut off, resulting in the surrender of 400,000 troops five days later. The Italian declaration of war on June 10 was only a footnote.

As the remaining French forces fell back to the LOIRE RIVER and the interior of France, the determination of the French high command to continue the struggle dissolved. Weygand strongly advised French Premier Paul REYNAUD against continuing the war from North Africa, and neither he nor the French Navy made any preparations to that end. Instead, Weygand and Marshal Philippe PÉTAIN, who had been brought into the government because of his immense military prestige, insisted that France request an armistice. Reynaud demurred at first, but as the remaining French military forces began to dissolve and the German advance throughout France continued, he finally resigned on June 16. Pétain took office the same day and immediately asked for terms. A cease-fire was declared on June 20; then came the armistices of June 22 and June 24 (the latter effective June 25), formally ending the struggle. German dead totaled 40,000, to 100,000 for France—nothing like the 3 million on both sides for the same stakes in World War I. At least for France, the war of attrition would not be repeated. But the debacle had stunned the world.

On the German side, great credit was due not only to Manstein, the chief designer of the strategic plan, but to Heinz Guderian, who put his long-held theories about armor into practice in leading the German advance to the sea. In the words of B. H. LIDDELL HART, the British military historian and prophet of armored warfare, "The Battle of France is one of history's most striking examples of the decisive effect of a new idea, carried out by a dynamic executant." **J.C.**

FRANCK, James (1882–1964). A German physicist, corecipient of the Nobel Prize for Physics in 1925. Franck emigrated to the United States in 1935, where he conducted research in photochemistry and atomic physics. He worked on the ATOMIC BOMB project but opposed the dropping of the bomb, favoring instead a demonstration of its power.

FRANCO, Francisco (1892–1975). Leader of the Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War, who defeated the opposing Republican forces and became head of the Spanish state. In spite of the military aid and personnel that Benito MUSSOLINI and Adolf HITLER provided to Franco's forces during the Civil War, Franco refused to enter World War II in alliance with the Axis powers. Hitler was thus unable to establish a fascist bloc in southern Europe and seal off the Mediterranean, and this failure left French North Africa vulnerable to the moves of his enemies.

On October 23, 1940, during the period when Hitler was all-conquering, he found in Franco a worthy and wily dialectical opponent. During a nine-hour meeting at the town of Hendaye, on the Franco-Spanish border, the Spanish Caudillo argued so tiresomely and evaded commitments so deftly that the Führer was later moved to remark to Mussolini: "Rather than go through that again, I would prefer to have three or four teeth pulled out."

FRANÇOIS-PONCET, André (1887–1978). French ambassador to Berlin (1931–38) and to Rome (1938–40) and a member of the Académie Française. During World War II François-Poncet was coordinator of the Paris and VICHY press before going into exile in 1943. He published several volumes about these troubled years in French history, including *Souvenir d'une Ambassade à Berlin* (1946), *De Versailles à Potsdam* (1947) and *Au Palais Farnèse, Souvenirs d'une Ambassade à Rome* (1961).

FRANGIBLE GRENADE. U.S. Army term for a MOLOTOV COCKTAIL. It consisted of a glass bottle filled with thickened gasoline; gasoline and alcohol; hydrocyanic acid; or a smoke-producing compound. The incendiary versions had an igniter taped or clamped to the bottle to set off the contents when the bottle was shattered.

FRANK, Anne (1929–1945). Born in Germany, Anne Frank emigrated to Amsterdam with her parents in 1933. During the German occupation the family, which was Jewish, and four friends hid for two years in rooms behind a warehouse. Dutch friends sustained them until the GESTAPO discovered their refuge in 1944 and sent them to a concentration camp. Anne died in BERGEN-BELSEN; only her father survived. Anne's *Diary of a Young Girl*, composed while in hiding, is a sensitive portrait of adolescence and a poignant testament to human courage.

FRANK, Hans (1900–1946). Born at Karlsruhe in Baden, Frank completed his legal training in 1926 and, after a period of service in the SA (*see* SA), became legal adviser to Adolf HITLER. He was an intelligent man, though of somewhat unstable character, and his background and seeming administrative ability led to his rapid promotion by Hitler, first as head of the party's legal department in 1929, and then as state minister of justice for Bavaria (1933), Reich Commissioner of Justice and Minister without Portfolio, as well as president of the Law Academy, which he founded. In 1939 he was appointed governor general of the central Polish territory not annexed by Germany or Russia, known as the Government General. With headquarters at Wavel Castle, Krakow, his punitive rule aimed at the enslavement of the Poles and the extermination of the Jews. When the Germans were faced with defeat, his morale collapsed. His rule in Poland ended in August 1944, and after the war he faced trial in NUREMBERG as a major war criminal. In emotional terms, he admitted his guilt, and while in captivity he compiled a lengthy